One area of incredible advances and promises within neurotechnology has been brain imaging technologies (BIT). But great promises often come along with great perils. In addition, given that BIT is not confined any more to the clinical setting the different ethical issues it can bring to the fore go beyond those that are regularly discussed in the medical context. For instance, who should see or have access to our brain image? Should neuroimages be used as evidence in court? Or for commercial issues? Here I will explore from a neuroethics perspective some of the promises and perils surrounding the uses of BIT outside the medical and research arenas. BITs are generally seen as technologies to monitor brain function. Among BIT one of the most portrayed in the media and public discourse is functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), but there are other imaging technologies, such as Positron emission Tomography (PET) and electroencephalography EEG. BIT has unique capabilities inasmuch as it can help us to understand the brain in detail and depth that previous technologies and methods have not enabled us to achieve before. It can also help us to understand how the brain develops, changes and wires itself, which in turn can shed light into our understanding of human behavior and cognition. So among the promises of BIT we found claims related to it helping us to better monitor and diagnose neuro-related diseases and conditions, which could have a positive impact for society. However, we should bear in mind that at present BIT is far from being perfect, and its reliability is often questioned, being charged with issues related to overinference, neuroasthetics, confirmation bias, and trait state confusion (Farah, 2010, Wolpe et al, 2005). There is another source of concern, namely the way neuroimaging results are interpreted. Some people have seen the potential of BITs to tell us something about mental states which can then be used for: neuromarketing, lie detection (brain reading), and assessment of potential dangerousness. Others have seen it as the analogous to genotyping, in which through our brainotype we will be able to measures, for instance how personality traits are reflected in the brain’s functional architecture and as such determine the kind of persons we are or how different brain areas at work can tell us about morally relevant intuitions and those that are not (Levy, 2011). However, it is questionable the ability of brain imaging to provide an objective interpretation of complex social behavior (Phelps and Thomas, 2003), such as whether someone is lying (Wolpe and Foster, 2005), likely to show dangerous behavior or about our morality (Cabrera, 2011). It is one thing to use BIT to predict the likelihood of someone developing a certain neurological condition and another thing to say that we can use BIT to predict dangerousness. Imaging technologies can tell us that certain mental activity correlates with activity in certain brain region, but not whether the activity is actually the result the mental activity itself. Now, even if we ever developed a BIT with which we feel comfortable to use for assessing whether someone has committed or not a crime, or whether that someone shows a ‘dangerous brain’ and as such it is unsuitable for release, it will not make much sense to use it for such purposes unless we already have a program in place to deal with the positive cases we might encounter. We have to remain cautious in the ways we use neuroimaging technologies but also in the way we interpret neuroimages. The new understandings that BIT promise to give us can certainly help us to capture the dynamic and complex ways of our mental life, including our intuitions, beliefs, desires as they tell us about their neural/psychological bases and the way they are influenced by reasoning, emotion, and social influences; but these new understandings could also reduce complex human behaviors to just certain brain activities while stigmatizing other important resources and elements of our mental processes (Cabrera, 2011). As Martha Farah (2010) has put it “some of the most profound ethical challenges from neuroscience come not from new technologies but from new understandings”. Thus, if we want to ensure that these technologies are used for the benefit of our society, then we have to start questioning ourselves about the practical value of neuroscientific knowledge and how we should best realize it.